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ABSTRACT. 
We characterize the literacy of an individual in a domain by their elicited subjective belief
distribution over the possible responses to a question posed in that domain. By eliciting the
distribution, rather than just the answers to true/false or multiple choice questions, we can directly
measure the confidence that an individual has about their knowledge of some fact. We consider
literacy across several financial and economic domains. We find considerable demographic
heterogeneity in the degree of literacy. We also measure the degree of consistency within a sample
about their knowledge, even when that knowledge is imperfect. 
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When we say that someone is literate we mean more than that they can just “read and write.”
The term more generally indicates someone who is educated, whether by formal or informal means,
and able to comprehend topics through words.1 Characterizing and measuring the literacy of an
individual requires then that we have some way of assessing how knowledgeable the person is about
certain topics. There are some topics about which one can have “crisp” knowledge, in the sense of
Boolean truth values. However, there are many domains of knowledge that one naturally expects
varying levels of precision. We characterize literacy in terms of the subjective beliefs that someone
has over possible responses to some question. By eliciting the subjective belief distribution, rather
than just the answers to true/false or multiple choice questions, we can directly measure the
confidence that an individual has about their knowledge of some fact.
Following Savage [1971][1972], we define subjective beliefs by the choices that individuals
make when facing bets whose outcomes depend on those beliefs. The measurement of the literacy
that someone has in a specific domain entails the elicitation of their subjective beliefs. For that task
we conduct an experiment using proper scoring rules, which are simply structured bets offered to
the individual by an observer (the experimenter). All of the elicited beliefs were incentivized and
incentive-compatible, so that the subjects were making real choices with real economic
consequences.
Our approach is to elicit the entire subjective belief distribution that an individual has, to
ascertain how precise their knowledge is in response to some question. This extends and generalizes
the prevailing approach to measuring literacy, which considers responses to (hypothetical) multiple
1 The Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition) defines the adjective “literate” as someone who is
“acquainted with letters or literature; educated, instructed, learned.” Remund [2010] offers a balanced account
of the many definitions of literacy found in the academic and policy literature. Our focus on financial
knowledge corresponds to the first of his categories of conceptual definitions of literacy (p. 279).
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choice questions (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell [2007][2008][2013; §3]). For a specific question or
domain, we are able to say “how literate” the person is, rather than just say that they are or are not
literate. Of course, by asking a series of questions one can ascertain the fraction of correct answers
for an individual with the traditional approach, but that requires one to pool responses over
different questions which may span different knowledge domains.
The domains of interest to us are financial and economic knowledge. We consider a mixture
of questions in which the correct answer involves the application of logical and grammatical
principles, and questions in which the correct answer involves some specific fact. This reflects a
trend in the measurement of literacy towards the ability to draw logical or grammatical conclusions
from information presented in the question itself, and to also consider awareness of facts that are of
importance for the functioning of the individual. We apply and extend two questions on financial
planning and literacy by Lusardi and Mitchell [2007][2008] that have been used in the 2004 Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS). These questions measure the ability to understand and apply simple
economic concepts that are important in economic planning for the future such as compounding of
interest and inflation. We also ask individuals two questions on longevity, which is relevant for
retirement planning. These questions have been used by Bateman, Eckert, Geweke, Louviere, Thorp
and Satchell [2012] and in the HRS since 1992. The four questions are documented and discussed
further in section 1. 
A byproduct of our characterization is that we can also say something about the degree of
common knowledge that a sample of individuals have about some proposition. Quite apart from
whether or not a given individual knows the true answer with some precision, we often want to
know if a group of individuals have the same degree of knowledge. In effect, we are able to
operationalize several interpretations of what it means to have heterogeneous beliefs.
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Literacy is an important characteristic of economic behavior in it’s own right. It is also
something that behavioral and experimental economists should be interested in, since it goes to the
heart of whether someone has understood some task or not. If behavioral economics is concerned
with decisions that are commonly characterized as “mistakes” relative to some standard model or
normative criterion, then it is critical to know if the decision was a “correct” decision for a
misunderstood task, or an “incorrect” decision for an understood task. In psychology this is the area
of task representation, and literacy is one input into a subject arriving at their representation.
Similarly, when experimental economists claim that a subject has responded to a task with certain
properties, such as incentive-compatibility, they need to know whether the subject has indeed
understood the task and it’s properties: again, literacy is one input into this process.2
Our results show considerable variation in literacy levels over the financial and economic
domains we consider here and across observable demographic characteristics. In particular, older
subjects are more literate than younger subjects in the interest compounding domain, and women
exhibit higher literacy than men in the inflation domain. We also find that whites are more literate
than non-whites regarding the expected remaining lifetime of men, and older subjects are more
literate than younger subjects regarding the expected remaining lifetime for women. 
In section 1 we describe the experimental task that we developed and employed with a
sample of 120 subjects. We review in detail the properties of the subjective belief elicitation
procedure in section 2 and present results on the degree of literacy of our subjects in section 3. In
section 4 we consider the consistency of knowledge across subjects, and section 5 concludes. 
2 An important example in experimental economics is the Becker, DeGroot and Marschak [1964]
procedure for eliciting certainty-equivalents of lotteries. There remains considerable controversy about
whether subjects understand the incentive-compatibility of this procedure (Cason and Plott [2014]).
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1. Procedures
A. Literacy
We consider literacy in terms of four specific questions asked of each subject in an
experiment. In each case there is a correct answer, and responses were elicited over a continuous
range of possible answers presented in terms of 10 intervals or “bins.” A computer interface was
used to present the belief elicitation tasks to subjects and record their choices, allowing them to
allocate tokens in accordance with their subjective beliefs. Figure 1 presents the interface.3 The
interface implements the Quadratic Scoring Rule discussed in section 2. Subjects could move the
sliders at the bottom of the screen to re-allocate the 100 tokens as they wished, ending up with some
distribution. The instructions explained that they could earn up to £20, as shown in Figure 2, but
only by allocating all 100 tokens to one interval and that interval containing the true answer: if the
true answer was just outside the selected interval, they would in that case receive £0. At the time of
the experiments in December 2012, £20 was worth roughly $32.
Subjects were rewarded for one of these belief elicitation tasks, with the task selected at
random.4 The correct answer was revealed, and their earnings calculated according to the number of
tokens allocated to the true interval in their elicited beliefs. For example, if the respondent had
3 The instructions are reproduced in full in Appendix A. The interface was initialized with 10 tokens
allocated to each bin.
4 The experiments also contained 4 belief elicitation questions that posed questions that tested
knowledge of statistical principles and more specifically the application of Bayes Rule. The first pair of
questions on the risk of breast cancer are taken from the 15 questions considered by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
[1995; Table 2, p. 693]. Our Q5 and Q6 are direct translations of the parameters they use for the same breast
cancer risk question. The difference between Q5 and Q6 is that the former uses conventional probability
information to set up the problem, and the latter uses natural frequencies to set up the same problem.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage [1995; Figure 3, p. 694] report a dramatic improvement in the correct application of
Bayes Rule as their subjects moved from the probability format to the frequency format. Our questions Q7
and Q8 consider another application of Bayes Rule reasoning, but with a financial example having to do with
the risk of consumer credit solvency. This issue is particularly important in the United Kingdom, which had
relatively high levels of consumer debt coming into the global recession of 2008. Our conclusions do not rely
on the inclusion of these 4 belief elicitation questions, which is why we do not report the results here.  
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reported the beliefs in Figure 1, she would have been paid £16.25 if the correct answer was between
8% and 9.99%. As it happens, the correct answer here is 7.9%, so the subject would have actually
received £11.25 since the correct answer was in the next lower interval, corresponding to
unemployment rates between 6% and 7.99%.
The incentivized questions were as follows:
• Q1: Interest Compounding. “Suppose you had £100 in a savings account and the interest
rate is 2% per year and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how
much would you have on this account in total?” The correct answer is £110.40, and
responses were elicited between £105 and £115 in intervals of £1.
• Q2: Inflation. “Suppose you had £200 in a saving account. The interest rate on your saving
account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would be
the value of the money on this account?” The correct answer is £197.96, and responses were
elicited between £195 and £205 in intervals of £1. Due to a rounding error we rewarded
subjects as if the correct answer was £198, and treat that as the “correct” answer.
• Q3: Expected Lifetime for Men. “Based on 2010 National Statistics, if a man lived to be
20 in the United Kingdom, how many more years would he expect to live? Note that this is
not the age he would die at, but how many more years he would expect to live.” The correct
answer is 59.1 years, and responses were elicited between 0 and 100 years in intervals of 10
 years.5
• Q4: Expected Lifetime for Women. “Based on 2010 National Statistics, if a woman lived
to be 20 in the United Kingdom, how many more years would she expect to live? Note that
this is not the age she would die at, but how many more years she would expect to live.” The
correct answer is 62.9 years, and responses were elicited between 0 and 100 years in intervals
of 10 years.
The order of presentation of questions was randomized for each subject.
The first two questions are natural extensions of questions asked by Lusardi and Mitchell
[2007][2008] in the Health & Retirement Survey (HRS) of 2004 in the United States.6 This survey is
5 At the time of the experiment we did not have access to the correct Life Tables, and instead
subtracted 20 from the expected lifetime at birth from the UK Office of National Statistics to pay subjects
that had this question selected. The difference for aggregates such as “all men” or “all women” is tiny, and did
not affect the payments to any subject given that the bin intervals we used were in 10-year increments: there is
a difference of 0.6 of a year for men (59.1 versus 58.5), and 0.5 of a year for women (62.9 versus 62.4).
6 A third question they asked was: Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single
company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.”  This question was posed in order to
understand if the individuals know how to diversify their investment. In a later Dutch national survey van
Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie [2011] increased the set of questions posed to individuals. Apart from 5 questions
aimed at characterizing “basic” financial literacy (p. 452), they added 11 questions to characterize “advanced”
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naturally representative of Americans over the age of 50. Our Q1 adapts the following question of
theirs: “Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 percent per year.
After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow:
more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102?” The main difference is that we ask for beliefs about
the true answer over a wide range. Our Q2 adapts this question of theirs: “Imagine that the interest
rate on your savings account was 1 percent per year and inflation was 2 percent per year. After 1
year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in
this account?” Lusardi and Mitchell [2012; Table 2.1] report that only 67.1% and 75.2% of their
sample gave the correct response to each question, respectively. These fractions drop significantly
(their Figures 2.1a and 2.1b) as one considers Black and Hispanic respondents. When the same
questions were posed to a nationally representative sample of young Americans, aged between 22
and 28 in Wave 11 of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth conducted in 2007-2008, 79.3% and
54.0% gave the correct responses to the interest rate and inflation questions, respectively (Lusardi,
Mitchell and Curto [2010; Table 1, p. 365]).7
The final two questions ask about a basic informational input to retirement planning:
expected remaining lifetime, conditional on reaching the age of 20. Indeed, Smith, Taylor and Sloan
[2001; p. 1126] call this “the most important subjective risk assessment a person can make,”
although they were referring to own-mortality. We separate out the question for men and women, to
ascertain if the differential expected mortality between the two is recognized by individuals. These
questions do not condition on the health, income, or any other relevant characteristics of the
financial literacy (p. 454). Similar extensions were undertaken by Bateman, Eckert, Geweke, Louviere, Thorp
and Satchell [2012] in surveys in Australia.
7 Bateman, Eckert, Geweke, Louviere, Thorp and Satchell [2012] ask these questions of adult
retirement savers in Australia, and find that 78.4% get the inflation question correct and 71.8% get the interest
rate question correct.
6
individual that would affect expected mortality. One could easily extend these questions to elicit
more precise beliefs about someone who is more similar to the subject.
The most widely used subjective beliefs about longevity come from the Health and Retirement
Survey, which has asked a simple question since 1992 to respondents under the age of 65: “With 0
representing absolutely no chance, and 100 absolute certainty, what is the chance that you will live to
be 75 years of age or older?” A comparable question asks the chance that they would live to be 85,
and for respondents over 65 a variant asked the chances of them living 11-15 years more. In the
2006 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey a sub-sample was asked questions that elicited their
beliefs about the population life tables: “Out of a group of [men/women] your age, how many do
you think will survive to the age of X?” The value of X was 75 for those under 65 themself, and 11-
15 years older for those over 65. These questions are closer to those we asked, although we only
conditioned on the single age 20.
Of course, these questions are not incentivized, and do not elicit information on the
confidence of the subjective belief. However, Smith, Taylor and Sloan [2001] show that responses to
this question are reasonably good predictors of future, actual mortality, even if they do not perfectly
reflect new health information when updated. Perozek [2008] makes an even stronger case for the
predictive value of these subjective belief questions, arguing that responses to these questions
actually outperform population life tables. In contrast, Elder [2013] stresses that only with the 2006
wave can one evaluate the actual predictions, as early respondents reach the target ages of 75 or 85.
And in that respect he presents a sharply contrary view, arguing that the evidence supports a
“flatness bias,” a “tendency for individuals to understate the likelihood of living to relatively young
ages while overstating the likelihood of living to ages beyond 80.” He attributes this bias to a failure
to recognize that mortality risk increases with age.
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B. Demographics and Additional Measures
Apart from these incentivized subjective belief questions, which are our main focus, we
asked subjects several hypothetical questions that have been widely used in the literature on
cognitive abilities. One is Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) proposed by Frederick [2005],
consisting of three questions:
• A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost?
• If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets?
• In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of
the lake?
 
The correct answers are £0.05, 5 minutes and 47 days. Many subjects responding to these
hypothetical questions fail to “reflect” on some aspect of the information provided.8 The other
hypothetical battery is known as the Berlin Numeracy Test, and is due to Cokely, Galesic, Schulz,
Ghazal and Garcia-Retamero [2012]:
• Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws how
many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)?
• Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members
in the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are men.
What is the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? (Please
indicate the probability in percentage).
• Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides) 70 times. The probability that the die shows a
6 is twice as high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out of these
70 throws, how many times would the die show the number 6?
• In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A red mushroom is
poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a
probability of 5%. What is the probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red?
 
8 It is an interesting question whether one should care if subjects get the CRT questions right when
they face incentives. In fact, many subjects do if they get sufficient time to answer the questions, see
Borghans, Meijers and ter Weel [2008]. It could be argued that the CRT is designed to detect cognitive
propensities to spot “minimally hidden” information in decision settings, and that this propensity is better
detected when higher-order, executive brain functions are not engaged to earn money.
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The correct answers are 30, 25%, 20 and 50%.
In addition, a standard list of demographic questions were posed. These included age, sex,
racial group, field of study, year of study, highest level of formal education expected to complete,
current grade, citizenship, marital status, number of people in household, total income of the
household, total income of parents, and smoking status.
2. Belief Elicitation
The decision maker in our experiment reports her subjective beliefs with a discrete version
of a Quadratic Scoring Rule for continuous distributions, developed by Matheson and Winkler
[1976]. Partition the domain into K intervals, and denote as r k the report of the density in interval k
= 1, ÿ, K. Assume for the moment that the decision maker is risk neutral, and that the full report
consists of a series of reports for each interval, { r1, r2, ÿ, r k ,ÿ, r K } such that r k $ 0 œk and ' i = 1ÿK
(r i ) = 1.
If k is the interval in which the true value lies, then the payoff score is from Matheson and
Winkler [1976; p.1088, equation (6)]:
S = (2 × r k) - ' i = 1ÿK (r i )2 
The reward in the score is a doubling of the report allocated to the true interval, and a penalty that
depends on how these reports are distributed across the K intervals. The subject is rewarded for
accuracy, but if that accuracy misses the true interval the punishment is severe. The punishment
includes all possible reports, including the correct one.
Consider some examples, assuming K = 4. What if the subject has very tight subjective
beliefs and puts all of the tokens in the correct interval? Then the score is
S = (2 × 1) - (12 + 02 + 02 + 02 ) = 2 - 1 = 1,
9
and this is positive. But if the subject has a tight subjective belief that is wrong, the score is
S = (2 × 0) - (12 + 02 + 02 + 02 ) = 0 - 1 = -1,
and the score is negative. So we see that this score would have to include some additional
“endowment” to ensure that the earnings are positive.9 Assuming that the subject has a very diffuse
subjective belief and allocates 25% of the tokens to each interval, the score is less than 1:
S = (2 × ¼) - (¼2 + ¼2 + ¼2 + ¼2 ) = ½ - ¼ = ¼ < 1.
The tradeoff from the last case is that one can always ensure a score of ¼, but there is an incentive
to provide less diffuse reports, and that incentive is the possibility of a score of 1.
To ensure complete generality, and avoid any decision maker facing losses, allow some
endowment, α, and scaling of the score, β. We then get the generalized scoring rule
α + β [ (2 × r k) - ' i =1ÿK (r i ) 2 ]
where we initially assumed α=0 and β=1. We can assume different values of α and β to transform
the payoffs to any alternative range of  levels we may want.
In our experiment K = 10, and we do not know whether the subject is risk neutral. Indeed,
the weight of evidence from past experiments clearly suggests that subjects will be modestly risk
averse over the prizes they face. It is well-known that risk aversion can significantly affect inferences
from applications of the Quadratic Scoring Rule when eliciting subjective probabilities over binary
events (Winkler and Murphy [1970], Kadane and Winkler [1988]), and there are various methods for
addressing these concerns.10 Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm [2012] characterize the
implications of the general case of a risk averse agent when facing the QSR and reporting subjective
9 This is a point of practical behavioral significance, but is not important for the immediate
theoretical point.
10 For instance, see Köszegi and Rabin [2008], Holt and Smith [2009], Karni [2009], Andersen,
Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2014] and Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2014].
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distributions over continuous events, and find, remarkably, that these concerns do not apply with
anything like the same force. For empirically plausible levels of risk aversion, one can reliably elicit
the most important features of the latent subjective belief distribution without undertaking
calibration for risk attitudes.
Specifically, they draw the following conclusions:
1. An individual reports having a positive probability for an event only if he has positive
subjective probability for the event. So if the individual believes that unemployment is
definitely below 12%, we would never see the individual reporting that it could be above
12%. Further, we can infer from Figure 1, for instance, that this subject truly attaches zero
weight to the possibility of unemployment above 12%, no matter what his risk attitudes.
2. If an individual has the same subjective probability for two events, then the reported
probabilities for the two events will also be the same if the individual is risk averse or risk
neutral. So if the individual has a true, latent subjective probability of 0.1 that the
unemployment rate is between 6% and 7.99%, and a true, latent subjective probability of 0.1
that it is between 10% and 11.99%, then the reported probabilities for these two intervals
will be the same as well, as in Figure 1 (although typically not 0.1).
3. The converse is true for risk averse subjects, as well as for risk lovers. That is, if we observe
two events receiving the same reported probability, we know that the true probabilities are
also equal, although not necessarily the same as the reported probabilities.
4. If the individual has a symmetric subjective distribution, then the reported mean will be exactly
the same as the true subjective mean, whether or not the subjective distribution is unimodal.
Hence if we simply assume symmetry of the true distribution, a relatively weak assumption
in some settings, we can elicit the mean belief directly from the average of the reported
11
distribution.
5. The more risk averse an agent is, the more the reported distribution will resemble a uniform
distribution defined on the support of their true distribution. In effect, risk aversion causes
the individual to report a “flattened” version of their true distribution, but never to report
beliefs to which they assign zero subjective probability.
6. It is possible to derive the effect of increased risk aversion on the difference between the
reported distribution and true distribution. Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm
[2012] show numerically that a priori plausible levels of risk aversion in laboratory settings
implies no significant deviation between reported and true subjective beliefs in this setting.
Provided that our subjects exhibit the modest levels of risk aversion that are typically found
in lab settings with similar stakes, these results provide the basis for using the reported distributions
as if they are the true, subjective belief distributions.11
3. The Measurement of Economic Literacy
A. Description of Results
In December 2012 we recruited 120 subjects from Durham University. The majority had
major fields of study in Finance or some other Business area, and were completing a Master of
Science degree. The average age was 24.4, 67% were women, and 85% were single and had never
been married. Just over 73% were non-EU citizens, and 14% were current smokers.
Figure 3 provides a quick helicopter tour of the aggregate beliefs we elicited. More formal
11 Alternatively, one could use a binary lottery procedure to “risk neutralize” subjects, as
demonstrated by Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm [2015]. Or one could use the methods
developed by Harrison and Ulm [2015] to recover latent subjective belief distributions from Expected Utility
Theory or Rank-Dependent Utility characterizations of risk preferences.
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statistical tests are provided below. We observe very precise beliefs for the interest compounding
question, which was relatively easy for our sample. Far less precision is observed for the other
questions. Aggregate beliefs for the economic literacy questions tended to be unimodal, with most
subjects having some sense of where the correct answer was, but with varying precision.
Figures 4 and 5 begin the evaluation of individual responses for the two financial literacy
questions about interest compounding and inflation and the value of money. In each case we report
the correct answer, a “literacy index” and “concordance index,” the responses of three individuals
selected to illustrate some differences in individual behavior, and the pooled distribution. We discuss
the concordance index in the next section. 
We construct a simple index of literacy, L 0 [0, 1], given by the fraction of 100 tokens that
the individual allocates to the interval containing the true answer.12 This index does not need to be
estimated: it is a direct transformation of the observed data. Thus we see a value of L=1 for subject
#1 in Figure 5, the interest compounding domain, since this subject allocated all 100 tokens to the
interval containing the correct answer. Many subjects did exactly the same thing in this case, but
subject #10 and subject #11 show how a few hedged their bets, quite literally. For subject #10, 60
of the 100 tokens were in the interval containing the correct answer, so L=0.60 for this subject.
In Figure 5 we see that subject #1 has a literacy index of zero, since she allocated all 100
tokens to the interval just to the left of the correct answer for the inflation question. In this domain,
12 There are many other literacy indices that could be constructed from these data. For instance, a
natural metric would be the amount of money that the subject had “left on the table” by not allocating all 100
tokens to the correct answer. This reflects the QSR underlying the incentives provided to subjects to be more
precise, and is therefore a non-linear transformation of all token allocations. More generally, there is one way
to be completely correct about these questions, and 4,263,421,511,270 ways to be wrong. If there are t tokens
and b bins, then there are (t+b-1)!/t!(b-1)! possible allocations in each of our elicitation tasks. Only one of
these is completely correct. If someone has a literacy index L=0 then there are still (100+9-1)!/100!(9-1)! =
352,025,629,371 ways to respond.
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subject #5 has a literacy index of 0.26 since 26 out of 100 tokens were allocated to the correct
interval. By being less dogmatic, subject #5 exhibited greater literacy than subject #1. Of course,
one might want to argue that subject #1 was very close to the correct answer, but countering that
claim is the subject’s choice, implicitly saying that she was certain of her answer. If indeed she has
some imprecision, that should have led her to report a non-degenerate distribution.
Figures 6 and 7 consider the other questions, about expected remaining lifetime for men and
women. Figure 6 shows detailed responses for 11 individuals to the question about men, since we
observe considerable heterogeneity in this domain compared to the financial literacy questions. The
imprecision for subject #3, #5 and #7 is substantial, and leads one to speculate if it shows up in
their savings behavior or retirement planning. Figure 7 shows the differences in the aggregate
distribution between the questions about men and women, to gauge if the longer expected lifetime
of women compared to men is generally understood. Indeed, we see that this increment is detected
in aggregate, so we can say that we observe a reasonable “literacy of crowds” on this issue.
Finally, Figure 8 collates information on the distribution of the literacy indices L across the
domains considered. The vertical, dashed line is the average of each distribution, for reference. The
distribution for the interest compounding question, in the top left panel of Figure 8, is what one
would normatively like to see: almost universal high-literacy. However, one can visually infer that
this is the exception across these domains.
Our measure of literacy is sensitive to the range of possible answers and the intervals of the
10 bins in the belief elicitation task. If one follows the prevailing approach the literacy index is either
1 or 0 depending on whether the individual provides the correct answer to the question or not. By
eliciting the distribution of beliefs we move away from a binary measure of literacy at the level of the
individual and the measure of literacy is now a discrete variable determined by the fraction of tokens
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allocated to the interval that contains the correct answer. Increasing the size of the intervals in the
belief elicitation task increases the likelihood that the individual will put a larger fraction of tokens
on the interval with the correct answer, and thus the likelihood of being characterized as more
literate. A related issue is the symmetry of the interval around the correct answer. If the individual is
uncertain about the correct answer to the question then our measure of literacy is sensitive to where
the correct answer falls in the interval, and we are more likely to report a higher level of literacy if
the correct answer is the midpoint of the interval instead of one of the two endpoints. There is no
correct way to design the belief elicitation task and we chose a design with 10 symmetric intervals of
the same size, but where the correct answer is not the midpoint of the interval. 
B. Statistical Analysis of Results
A natural statistical model for directly evaluating the beliefs data is interval regression. In this
specification the dependent variable refers to the intervals given by our elicitation “bins.”13 Each of
the 10 intervals in the belief elicitation task is weighted by the number of tokens that the subject puts
on the interval, and we use frequency weights in the interval regression model to indicate the
number of duplicated observations (tokens). In all cases we control for sex, age, marital status, race,
whether a Finance major, whether a non-EU citizen, whether a current smoker, and the scores on
the CRT and Berlin Numeracy Test. Unless otherwise noted, the age and test scores are normalized
to have mean zero and unit standard deviation. 
Detailed estimates from the interval regression models for each belief question are reported
13 Interval regression allows one to identify clopen intervals with -4 as a lower bound or  +4 as an
upper bound, but that is not generally appropriate for our elicitation tasks. We evaluate the effects of using
such clopen bounds for the interest compounding and inflation questions, and it makes no difference to our
conclusions.
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in Tables 1 through 4. The estimated constant for the interest compounding question (Table 1) is
109.7 which is lower than the true response of 110.4. Although there is very little variation in the
dependent variable here (Figure 4), we find that the marginal effect of age is positive and
significantly different from 0 (p-value of 0.040), indicating that older individuals are slightly more
literate with respect to interest compounding. A similar conclusion has been found by Delavande,
Rohwedder and Willis [2008], Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto [2010] and Lusardi and Mitchell [2014].14
We find that females exhibit higher literacy than men in the inflation domain, contrary to the general
findings in the literature using hypothetical surveys.
We find that whites are more literate than non-whites on the expected remaining life years
for men (Table 3), and that older individuals are more literate on the expected remaining life years
for women (Table 4). These outcomes are in line with the literature using hypothetical surveys
(Lusardi and Mitchell [2014] and Bissonette and de Bresser [2015]).
We evaluate the systematic effect of demographics more formally by pooling across
measures of literacy L in different domains. We estimate a generalized linear model of the literacy
index L, using the specification proposed by Papke and Wooldridge [1996] for fractional response
variables in the unit interval. Table 5 reports the effects of the listed covariates on the literacy index.
Focusing only on statistically significant effects at the 10% level, in this sample marriage is associated
with an increase in illiteracy; being a Finance major is associated with heightened literacy; being a non-
14 Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis [2008] use two sources of data: the Cognitive Economic Survey, an
internet survey interviewing people aged 51 and above, and the American Life Panel, an internet panel
interviewing people aged 18 and above. These two surveys have an identical group of 25 questions on
financial literacy, which allows them to merge the responses. Their regression analysis leads to the conclusion
that age has a negative correlation with financial literacy, as measured by them, even though years of formal
education have a positive correlation with financial literacy. Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto [2010] analyze data
from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth,  a sample of young adults aged 23 to 28 years old, and find
that formal education level is positively correlated with correct answers in both the compound interest rate
question and the inflation rate question. We do not control for years of education and find that age is positively
correlated with literacy. 
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EU citizen is associated with a much lower level of literacy compared to EU citizens; better scores
on the Cognitive Reflection Test are associated with lower literacy; and better scores on the Berlin
Numeracy Test is associated with a significantly higher probability of being literate. These significant
effects are a mix of the expected (e.g., the Berlin Numeracy Test) and the unexpected (e.g., being
married). There are also some effects that the previous literature suggested to be significant, which
we do not find (e.g., gender and age). The significance of these effects also points to the
heterogeneity of literacy across these domains.
4. The Consistency of Knowledge
Although literacy is a capacity that is naturally measured for the individual, it obviously
impacts the extent to which knowledge about something is shared.15 If someone has a poor level of
literacy in some domain, the natural question is whether that is consistent with the knowledge that
others have. The immediate consequences for behavior when there are heterogeneous beliefs are by
now well-studied, such as in models of asset pricing in finance (e.g., Shefrin [2008]), game theoretical
interaction, and rational expectations.
These ideas are also familiar from linguistics. The process of learning a language involves the
disambiguation of utterances (Allen [1995]). And many linguists discuss language use as intentionally
constrained by norms of communicating understanding, which is to say greater literacy (Grice
15 When measuring the literacy of a household, how does one account for the heterogeneity of levels of
literacy within the household? The concept of effective literacy, developed by Basu and Foster [1998],
considers this important dimension of what might also be called “social literacy.” Obviously the measurement
issues goes beyond the household, and includes any social network used by individuals for making decisions.
One approach focuses on potential literacy, and defines literacy in terms of the most literate person in the
household. This adjustment to naïve measures of literacy at the individual level is easy to make, and provides a
valuable upper bound. One could, however, similarly define a lower bound if the household power
relationships lead to the least literate person imposing his or her will on the household decision in some
setting. Using our tools for characterizing the production function for social literacy in these settings is an
important extension.
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[1989], Clark [1992]). Hence one naturally seeks some measure of shared literacy. Is the uncertainty
over some fact in a given domain shared, or is it a domain in which one can clearly identify
“experts” and “novices?” We propose a simple measure that can allow us to address that question.
Any measuring instrument can be compared against another measuring instrument.
Examples include weight scales, political opinion polls, or medical judgements about diagnoses. In
our case we consider the subjective beliefs about some fact, and seek to measure their consistency.
In the biostatistics literature a popular concordance index ρc has been developed by Lin
[1989][2000]. It combines the familiar notion of correlation from a Pearson inter-class correlation
coefficient with allowance for bias, and is virtually identical to measures of intra-class correlation
(Nickerson [1997]). The concordance index is bounded between ±1, with the usual interpretation
that ρc = 1 indicates perfect concordance, and smaller values indicate poorer concordance.16 
In Figure 4, for instance, we evaluate the concordance index for each subject with respect to
the pooled belief distribution on the interest compounding question, and then also report the
average value of the index over all 120 subjects. Even though subject #1 in that setting had a literacy
index value of 1, since she gave the correct responses, her concordance with the group was slightly
less than 1 (0.972) because some people in the group did not have perfect literacy in this domain
(e.g., subjects #10 and #11, shown in Figure 4). Taking a less extreme case, such as the inflation and
value of money question in Figure 5, we see much lower levels of concordance. Subject #5, even
though less precise than subject #1 and subject #3, was more consistent with the beliefs that
everyone else had.
Moving to the distribution of concordance indices in each domain, Figure 9 shows the
16 The concordance correlation coefficient is defined as ρc = 2ρσxσy/ (σx2+σy2+(μx-μy)2), where μx andμx are the means of the two variables, σx and σy are the standard deviations, and ρ is the correlation coefficient
between the two variables.  
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heterogeneity of beliefs we elicited. The interest compounding question, in Figure 9, is again an
outlier, showing considerable literacy in this sample (from Figure 8) and hence considerable
consistency.
5. Conclusions
Literacy is a concept that is widely discussed, and clearly at the core of understanding
economic behavior in modern societies. We propose a characterization of literacy using the familiar
notion of a subjective belief distribution over questions in a certain domain.17 We demonstrate how
these belief distributions can be elicited in an operational, incentive-compatible manner from
individuals. We show that there is considerable heterogeneity in literacy levels over economic and
financial domains, and across observable demographics.
Immediate extensions of our approach are to consider broader samples and other domains
of literacy, as well as the effects of controlled interventions on the distribution of literacy. Evaluation
of the consequences of imperfect illiteracy can be undertaken by studying the choices made, or
avoided, in related tasks that rely on literacy in that domain.18 Do semi-literate individuals avoid
17 The modern policy literature on literacy stresses the concept of “capability,” which is the extent to
which individuals use their knowledge, as distinct from being able to answer abstract questions successfully.
The concept of capability seeks to characterize if someone is able to function in a certain domain. This raises
many subtle, interesting issues. First, it is not obvious that someone must know the right answer in order to
be able to function in some domain robustly. There are some task domains where the payoffs are very “flat,”
in the sense that large errors in the specific choice lead to virtually the same expected payoff as more refined
choices. Second, it is also not obvious that someone must infer the right answer by applying grammatical or
logical algorithms in order to make good choices: heuristics might do very well in many domains, whether or
not there is a flat payoff at work in the region of choice. Third, the concept of capability raises the issue of
domain-specific knowledge, which goes beyond the “reasoning from first principles and the information in
front of you” approach that characterizes most analyses of literacy. Someone might be a wizard at applying
Bayes Rule, but simply have an incorrect prior belief about some base rate. Such a person would typically be
deemed statistically literate but not capable.
18 Another byproduct of our approach to literacy is the ability to formally characterize what it means
for individuals in a sample to be “overconfident” about their literacy, in the sense that they overplace
themselves relative to others. Moore and Healy [2008; p.508], Merkle and Weber [2011; p.264] and Benoit and
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welfare-improving choice domains for fear that they might make serious mistakes? Straightforward
extensions to consider social literacy are also important and natural using our characterization. 
Dubra [2011; p. 1605] explain why elicited subjective belief distributions are needed to evaluate such
hypotheses. These characterizations would then have immediate application to the related “unskilled and
unaware of it” hypothesis of Kruger and Dunning [1999] that those that tend to be less literate also tend to be
the least aware of their relative disability. 
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Figure 1: Belief Elicitation Interface
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Figure 2: Possible Belief Elicitation Response
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Figure 8: Literacy Indices
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Table 1: Estimates for Interest Compounding Question
True response was £ 110.4
 
Variable Estimate
Robust
Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Female 0.12 0.14 0.38 -0.15 : 0.39
Age 0.40 0.19 0.04 0.02 : 0.78
Single 0.64 0.45 0.15 -0.24 : 1.51
White 0.23 0.16 0.15 -0.08 : 0.54
Finance major 0.11 0.16 0.50 -0.20 : 0.42
Non EU citizen 0.002 0.13 0.99 -0.25 : 0.25
Current smoker -0.32 0.31 0.31 -0.93 : 0.30
Cognitive Reflection Test -0.04 0.08 0.58 -0.19 : 0.11
Berlin Numeracy Test 0.05 0.08 0.54 -0.11 : 0.21
Constant 109.71 0.46 <0.001 108.81 : 110.61
σ 0.95 0.12 0.74 : 1.22
 
Table 2: Estimates for Inflation Question
True response was £198
 
Variable Estimate
Robust
Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Female 0.66 0.30 0.03 0.07 : 1.25
Age -0.05 0.21 0.81 -0.45 : 0.35
Single -0.03 0.49 0.94 -1.00 : 0.93
White -0.15 0.42 0.73 -0.98 : 0.68
Finance major -0.33 0.25 0.19 -0.83 : 0.16
Non-EU citizen -0.78 0.47 0.10 -1.70 : 0.14
Current smoker -0.10 0.35 0.78 -0.77 : 0.58
Cognitive Reflection Test 0.08 0.15 0.59 -0.21 : 0.37
Berlin Numeracy Test 0.07 0.15 0.66 -0.23 : 0.37
Constant 199.17 0.60 <0.001 197.99 : 200.34
σ 1.70 0.10 1.51 : 1.91
26
Table 3: Estimates for Remaining Lifetime of Men Question
True response was 59.1 years
Variable Estimate
Robust
Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Female 2.26 2.50 0.36 -2.63 : 7.16
Age 2.45 2.31 0.29 -2.09 : 6.98
Single -3.49 7.02 0.62 -17.25 : 10.27
White 7.08 3.45 0.04 0.33 : 13.84
Finance major 3.84 2.69 0.15 -1.43 : 9.11
Non-EU citizen 1.31 3.62 0.72 -5.79 : 8.41
Current smoker 0.40 2.32 0.86 -4.15 : 4.95
Cognitive Reflection Test -0.92 1.34 0.50 -3.54 : 1.71
Berlin Numeracy Test 1.79 1.46 0.22 -1.06 : 4.64
Constant 48.28 7.50 <0.001 33.59 : 62.98
σ 15.84 0.90 14.17 : 17.70
Table 4: Estimates for Remaining Lifetime of Women Question
True response was 62.9 years
Variable Estimate
Robust
Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Female 0.18 2.75 0.95 -5.21 : 5.58
Age 4.21 2.00 0.03 0.29 : 8.13
Single 4.53 5.63 0.42 -6.50 : 15.57
White 4.04 3.21 0.21 -2.25 : 10.33
Finance major 2.80 2.42 0.25 -1.94 : 7.54
Non-EU citizen -0.06 3.63 0.99 -7.17 : 7.05
Current smoker 1.30 2.75 0.63 -4.08 : 6.69
Cognitive Reflection Test -0.36 1.25 0.78 -2.81 : 2.10
Berlin Numeracy Test 0.42 1.43 0.77 -2.38 : 3.21
Constant 47.63 7.04 <0.001 33.83 : 61.43
σ 15.29 0.77 13.85 : 16.88
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Table 5: Pooled Estimates Characterizing Literacy
Variable
Average
Marginal Effects
Robust
Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Inflation Question
No 0.42 0.016 <0.001 0.39 : 0.46
Yes 0.34 0.031 <0.001 0.28 : 0.41
Difference -0.08 0.036 0.029 -0.15 : -0.008
Expected Lifetime for Men Question
No 0.43 0.016 <0.001 0.40 : 0.46
Yes 0.31 0.023 <0.001 0.27 : 0.36
Difference -0.11 0.026 <0.001 -0.17 : -0.06
Expected Lifetime for Women Question
No 0.43 0.016 <0.001 0.40 : 0.47
Yes 0.27 0.023 <0.001 0.23 : 0.32
Difference -0.16 0.028 <0.001 -0.21 : -0.11
Female
No 0.45 0.031 <0.001 0.39 : 0.51
Yes 0.40 0.018 <0.001 0.36 : 0.43
Difference -0.05 0.038 0.158 -0.13 : 0.02
Older than 24
No 0.40 0.018 <0.001 0.37 : 0.44
Yes 0.44 0.026 <0.001 0.39 : 0.49
Difference 0.04 0.033 0.269 -0.03 : 0.10
Single
No 0.35 0.040 <0.001 0.27 : 0.43
Yes 0.42 0.016 <0.001 0.39 : 0.46
Difference 0.07 0.043 0.087 -0.01 : 0.16
White
No 0.43 0.021 <0.001 0.39 : 0.47
Yes 0.38 0.027 <0.001 0.32 : 0.43
Difference -0.05 0.038 0.148 -0.13 : 0.02
Finance major
No 0.38 0.019 <0.001 0.35 : 0.42
Yes 0.47 0.025 <0.001 0.42 : 0.51
Difference 0.08 0.033 0.014 0.02 : 0.14
Non-EU citizen
No 0.49 0.038 <0.001 0.42 : 0.57
Yes 0.38 0.017 <0.001 0.35 : 0.42
Difference -0.11 0.043 0.011 -0.20 : -0.03
Current smoker
No 0.42 0.016 <0.001 0.39 : 0.45
Yes 0.36 0.034 <0.001 0.29 : 0.43
Difference -0.06 0.040 0.123 -0.14 : 0.02
Cognitive Reflection Test *
No 0.43 0.023 <0.001 0.38 : 0.47
Yes 0.40 0.021 <0.001 0.36 : 0.44
Difference -0.03 0.033 0.386 -0.09 : 0.04
Berlin Numeracy Test *
No 0.33 0.019 <0.001 0.29 : 0.37
Yes 0.50 0.026 <0.001 0.45 : 0.55
Difference 0.18 0.035 <0.001 0.11 : 0.24
* Binary indicator that the Cognitive Reflection Test score was 2 or more and that the Berlin Numeracy Test score was 3 or
more. In each case this indicates “smarter” individuals by these metrics.
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Figure 9: Concordance Indices
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Text in square brackets is for the experimenter only.
A. General Instructions
Introduction
You are now participating in a decision-making experiment. Based on your decisions in this
experiment, you can earn money that will be paid to you in cash today. It is important that you
understand all instructions before making your choices in this experiment. 
Please turn to silent, and put away, your mobile phone, laptop computer, or any other device
you may have brought with you. Please do not talk with others seated nearby for the duration of the
experiment. If at any point you have a question, please raise your hand and we will answer you as
soon as possible. 
The experiment consists of a demographic survey and two decision-making tasks. You have
already earned £5 for agreeing to participate in the experiment, which will be paid in cash at the end
of the session. In addition to this show-up fee, you may earn considerably more from your choices
in the decision-making tasks. These tasks and the potential earnings from them will be explained in
detail as we proceed through the session. 
Before we begin the experiment, we will give you an informed consent form. This form
explains your rights as a participant in the experiment, what the experiment is about and how we
make payments to you. [Give the informed consent form to subjects and read it out loud.]
We will begin the experiment by asking you to answer some demographic questions. Your
answers to those questions will not influence your payoffs. [Give the questionnaire to subjects.]
We will now continue with the first decision-making task. You will be given written
instructions, but make all decisions on the computer in front of you. We will distribute the
instructions and then read it out loud. Please remain silent during the experiment, and simply raise
your hand if you have any question so that an experimenter will come to you.
   [Give the first set of instructions to subjects and read it out loud.]
   [Determine earnings for each subject.]
We will now continue with the second decision-making task. You will again be given written
instructions and make all decisions on the computer in front of you. We will distribute the
instructions and then read it out loud. Please remain silent during the experiment, and simply raise
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your hand if you have any question so that an experimenter will come to you.
   [Give the second set of instructions to subjects and read it out loud.]
   [Determine earnings for each subject.]
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B. Belief Elicitation Instructions
Your Beliefs
This is a task where you will be paid according to how accurate your beliefs are about certain
things. You will be presented with 8 questions of the type we will explain below. You will actually
get the chance to play one question presented to you, so you should think carefully about your
answer to each question.
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a question might look like.
The display on your computer will be larger and easier to read. You have 10 sliders to adjust,
shown at the bottom of the screen, and you have 100 tokens to allocate. Each slider allows you to
allocate tokens to reflect your belief about the answer to this question. You must allocate all 100
tokens in order to submit your decision, and in this example we start with 10 tokens allocated to
each slider. The payoffs shown on the screen only apply when you allocate all 100 tokens. As you
allocate tokens, by adjusting sliders, the payoffs displayed on the screen will change. Your earnings
are based on the payoffs that are displayed after you have allocated all 100 tokens.
You can earn up to £20 in this task.
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Where you position each slider depends on your beliefs about the correct answer to the
question. In the above example the tokens you allocate to each bar will naturally reflect your beliefs
about the official unemployment rate for all 16-64 years old in the UK as of August 1, 2012. The
first bar here corresponds to your belief that the unemployment rate is between 0% and 1.99%. The
second bar corresponds to your belief that the unemployment rate is between 2% and 3.99%, and so
on. Each bar here shows the amount of money you earn if the official unemployment rate is in the
interval shown under the bar.
To illustrate how you use these sliders, suppose you think there is a fair chance the
unemployment rate is just under 5%. Then you might allocate the 100 tokens in the following way:
50 tokens to the interval 4% to 5.99%, 40 tokens to the interval 2% to 3.99%, and 10 tokens to the
interval 0% to 1.99%. So you can see in the picture below that if indeed the unemployment rate is
between 4% to 5.99% you would earn £15.80. You would then earn less than £15.80 for any other
outcome. You would earn £13.80 if the unemployment rate is between 2% and 3.99%, £7.80 if it is
between 0% and 1.99%, and for any other unemployment rate you would earn £5.80. 
 You can adjust the allocation as much as you want to best reflect your personal beliefs
about the unemployment rate.
Your earnings depend on your reported beliefs and, of course, the true answer. For instance,
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in the figure shown above. The true unemployment is 7.8%. So if you had reported the beliefs
shown above, you would have earned £5.80.
Suppose you had put all of your eggs in one basket, and for example allocated 100 tokens to
the interval corresponding to 2.5%. Then you would have faced the earnings outcomes shown
below.
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 Note the “good news” and “bad news” here. If the unemployment rate is indeed between
2% and 3.99%, you earn the maximum payoff, shown here as £20. But the true unemployment rate
is 7.8%, so you would have earned nothing in this task. 
It is up to you to balance the strength of your personal beliefs with the risk of them being
wrong. There are three important points for you to keep in mind when making your decisions:
    • Your belief about the correct answer to each question is a personal judgment that
depends on the information you have about the different events.  
    • Depending on your choices and the correct answer you can earn up to £20.
    • Your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to gamble.  
 The decisions you make are a matter of personal choice. Please work silently, and make your
choices by thinking carefully about the questions you are presented with.
When you are happy with your decisions, you should click on the Submit button and
confirm your choices. When everyone is finished we will reveal the right answer to each of the 8
questions. Then an experimenter will come to you and ask you to roll a 10-sided die until a number
between 1 and 8 comes up to determine which question will be played out. The experimenter will
record your earnings according to the correct answer and the choices you made.
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the £5 show-up fee that you receive just for
being here. 
Are there any questions?
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C. Demographic and Other Hypothetical Questions
ID ______________
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive. We will not be grading your
answers and your responses are completely confidential. Please think carefully about each question
and give your best answers. 
   1. What is your age? ____________ years
   2. What is your sex? (Circle one number.)
   01 Male
   02 Female
   3. Which of the following categories best describes you?  (Circle one number.)
   01 White
   02 Mixed
   03 Asian or Asian British 
   04 Chinese or other ethnic group
   05 Prefer not to say
   4.  What is your main field of study? (Circle one number.)
   01 Accounting
   02 Economics
   03 Finance
   04 Business Administration, other than Accounting, Economics, or Finance
   05 Education
   06 Engineering
   07 Health and Medicine
   08 Biological and Biomedical Sciences
   09 Math, Computer Sciences, or Physical Sciences
   10 Social Sciences or History
   11 Law
   12 Psychology
   13 Modern Languages and Cultures
   14 Other Fields
   5.  What is your year of studies?  (Circle one number.)
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   01 First year
   02 Second year
   03 Third year
   04 Masters
   05 Doctoral
   6. What is the highest level of education you expect to complete? (Circle one number)
   01 Bachelor’s degree
   02 Master’s degree
   03 Doctoral degree
   04 Professional qualification
   7. As a percentage, what is your current average mark if you are doing a Bachelor’s degree, or
what was it when you did a Bachelor’s degree? This mark should refer to all your years of study for
this degree, not just the current year. Please pick one by rounding up or down to the nearest
number:
   01 Above 70%
   02 Between 60 – 69%
   03 Between 50 – 59%
   04 Between 40 – 49%
   05 Less than 40%
   06 Have not taken courses for which grades are given.
   8. What is your citizenship status?
   01 British Citizen
   02 EU Citizen (non-British Citizen)
   03 Non-EU Citizen
   9. Are you currently:
   01 Single and never married?
   02 Married?
   03 Separated, divorced or widowed?
   10. How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse and any
dependents. Do not include your parents or roommates unless you claim them as dependents. 
________ 
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   11. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of income before tax earned
in the calendar year 2007 by the people in your household (as “household” is defined in question
10).  [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and dividend payments,
scholarship support, student loans, parental support, social security, alimony, and child support, and
others.]
   01 Less than £10,000
   02 £10,000 – £19,999
   03 £20,000 – £29,999
   04 £30,000 – £49,999
   05 Over £50,000
   12. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of income before tax earned
in the calendar year 2007 by your parents.  [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips,
interest and dividend payments, social security, alimony, and child support, and others.] 
   01 Less than £10,000
   02 £10,000 – £19,999
   03 £20,000 – £29,999
   04 £30,000 – £49,999
   05 Over £50,000
   06 Don’t Know
   13. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one number.)
   00 No
   01 Yes
   If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day? ________ cigarettes. 
   14. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost? £________
   15. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? ________ minutes
   16. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
________ days
   17. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws how
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many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)? ________ out of 50 throws.
   18. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members
in the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are men. What is
the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? (Please indicate the probability
in percent). ________%
   19. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The probability that the die shows a 6 is
twice as high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out of these 70 throws,
how many times would the die show the number 6? ________ out of 70 throws.
   20. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A red mushroom is
poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a probability of
5%. What is the probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red? ________%
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